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THE DEFENDANT INSURANCE
COMPANY IN AUTOMOBILE CASES
JA-MES E. COLEMAN

JITIGATION arising from automobile accidents has grown in recent years with the increase in the use and in the number of automobiles, so that now it occupies a large part of the time of trial and
appellate courts. A majority of the suits instituted are settled before
trial; but those which it is impossible to settle usually involve jury
trials, which of necessity last a number of days. A fair portion of these
cases are appealed, with the result that a number are reversed and new
trials are granted the appellants. As a consequence, the courts have in
the past been most solicitous to avoid the delay, expense and injustice
involved in such results, by doing all that is possible to insure a correct
and impartial trial in the first instance. It is recognized that the chance
for passion and prejudice to taint the result of a jury verdict is great
in any kind of case and to avoid that probability strict rules of procedure and evidence have been evolved. To insure a fair and impartial
trial and to promote the administration of justice, the courts have tried
to work out these rules of evidence so that their application in any particular case will eliminate all irrelevant and immaterial matter which
might be prejudicial or which might result in an unfair trial for either

party.
I.

It is well established that in a personal injury action arising out of
an automobile accident, evidence or statements that the driver of the
automobile, who has caused injury to another, carried insurance, are
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prejudicial and irrelevant where there is no issue involving insurance
coverage.
As a matter of good business foresight, many owners of motor vehicles carry liability insurance, whereby an insurance company obligates
itself by a contract with the assured to pay any judgment entered
against him as"a result of the negligent operation of h'is automobile.'
However, that ultimate liability, if found to exist, will fill upon an insurance company is altogether irrelevant to the issues of negligence or
damages between the parties; and a placing of that fact before the
jury, in the trial of a personal injury case, by whatever means, is held
to be prejudicial and irrelevant, but not reversible error where the trial
court promptly .instructs the jury to disregard such matter. The experienced trial lawyer realizes that the jury, even though properly instructed, still retains the information and that it does not cease to be
2
prejudicial to the defendant.
'The purpose of the policy of insurance is one of indemnity to protect the in-

sured against loss in the event liability is imposed upon him by law. The policy
is a bilateral contract in which a third party has no interest as there is no
privity of contract between the insurer and a third party; thus any rights or
benefits which a third party may have are subject to the terms and conditions
of the policy, as construed in the light of the statutes affecting it. Buckner v.
Buckner, 207 Wis. 303, 241 N.W. 342 (1932); Watkins v. Watkins, 210 Wis.
606, 245 N.W. 695 (1933).
In Wisconsin it is required by statute that the policy insure not only the
owner of the automobile, but also anyone operating it with his consent. Wis.
Stats. (1933) § 204.30 (3). Likewise the policy must provide that the insolvency or bankruptcy of the insured shall not release the insurer, and that
in all cases where execution on the judgment against the insured (or driver)
has been returned unsatisfied, the third party shall have the right to maintain
an action to recover the amount of such judgment from the insurer. Wis.
Stats. (1933), § 204.30 (1).
In recent years the policy has also provided in a clause included at the
instance of the insurer, that it shall be necessary for the third party to obtain
a judgment against the insured (or driver), before such third party has a
cause of action against the insurer. (See footnote 7, infra, for the reason why
such clause has been included.) The following is a typical so-called "no action"
clause:

"No action shall lie against the company to recover upon any claim or for

any loss under Insuring Agreement IV unless brought after the amount of
such claim or loss shall have been fixed and rendered certain either by
final judgment against the Assured after trial of the issue or by agreement
between the parties with the written consent of the Company, nor in any
event unless brought within two years after such final judgment or agreement."
2
Kellner V. Christiansen, 169 Wis. 390, 172 N.W. 796 (1919); Smith v. Yellow
Cab Co., 173 Wis. 33, 180 N.W. 503 (1920); Renniel v. Czaja, 183 Wis. 503,
198 N.W. 266 (1924); see Note, 56 A.L.R. 1418, 1419, 1422 (1928),
where it is stated: "Jurors as a class are thought to be prejudiced against insurance companies; and consequently, if they are told in effect that an insurance company, rather than the individual defendant of record, must bear the
final loss consequent upon a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, they will be less
inclined to return a verdict for the plaintiff, because of an unfair prejudice
against the insurer. * * * Such evidence, the courts argue, has a manifest and
strong tendency to carry the jury away from the real issue, and to lead them
to regard carelessly the legal rights of the defendant, on the ground that
someone else will have to pay the verdict."
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This rule is subject to certain qualifications which make it proper on
cross-examination to examine the defendant's witness upon the question of insurance in order to show interest, bias, or motive on the part
of the witness, notwithstanding that such examination will disclose to
the jury that the defendant is protected by insurance.3 Also on the voir
dire examination, it has been held proper to ask if any juror is employed by or has any stock in, or is a member of a particular insurance
company, in order to ascertain each one's qualifications to serve, and
to enable counsel to exercise intelligently his right of challenge, although such questioning is usually for the purpose of disclosing.to the
jury that the company referred to is the defendant's insurer.4 However,
it is always highly improper for counsel, in either his opening statement or his dosing argument, to make statements or arguments inferring that the: defendant carries liability insurance, or to state that he
will not have to pay the judgment rendered, or, as was recently heard,
to thank the Almighty that the defendant carried insurance.5
II.
The recent amendment to Section 260.11 of the Wisconsin Statutes
in effect permits prejudicial and irrelevant matter to be brought to the
attention of the jury.6
In 1931 the Legislature, by Chapter 375, Laws of 1931, amended
Section 260.11 of the Wisconsin Statutes,7 so as to authorize joinder of
3Martell v. Kutcher, 195 Wis. 19, 216 N.W. 522 (1928). The answers in this
case actually disclosed an interest, on the part of the witnesses questioned, in
the insurance company covering the risk; it would seem that these questions
must be asked in good faith and only where there is good reason to believe an
4 interest or bias in fact exists.
Faber v. C. Reiss Coal Co., 124 Wis. 554, 102 N.W. 1049 (1905) where it was
held that such questions were proper only if asked in good faith for the purpose of ascertaining the qualifications of jurors. Also see Lozon v. Leauzon
Bakery Co., 186 Wis. 84, 202 N.W. 296 (1925); Martell v. Kutcher, note 3,
supra; and Walker v. Poimush, 206 Wis. 45, 51, 238 N.W. 859 (1931), where it
is said: "This (rule) seems to imply that if counsel had any reason to believe or
suspected that any juror has stock in or was insured in the insurance company
named, it was proper to make the inquiry here made, but if no such reason
or suspicion existed the inquiry was improper." Cf. Dixon v. Russell, 156 Wis.
161, 164, 145 N.W. 761 (1914), where the Supreme Court, in upholding the
trial court's refusal to permit jurors to be examined as to their pecuniary
interest in certain named insurance companies, stated: "Time should not be
wasted, nor prejudice injected into the case, by an examination of jurors to
determine their qualifications on a subject that is not even claimed to be relevant and which can not be seen or presumed by 'the court to be so."
5Longhlin v. Brassel, 187 N.Y. 128, 79 N.E. 854 (1907); Note 56 A.L.R.
1419, 1453 (1928).
6 For a complete discussion of the Wisconsin Statutes and decisions relating to
joinder of insurance companies as defendants in cases arising out of automobile accidents, see McKenna, Joining the Insurer and Insured in Auto'mobile Cases, 17 Marq. Law Rev. 114 (1933).
SThe amendment provides as follows: "* * * In any action for damages
caused by the negligent operation, management or control of a motor vehicle,
any insurer of motor vehicles, which has an interest in the outcome of such
controversy adverse to the plaintiff or any of the parties to such controversy,

4
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the company insuring the defendant's automobile. It has been held that
this amendment will not permit joinder as defendant of an insurance
company whose policy was issued before the effective date of the
amendment, June 30, 1931, and contained a clause postponing action
against the insurer until final judgment has been secured against the
assured (commonly known as a "no action clause") . 8 Subsequently,
or which by its policy of insurance assumes or reserves the right to control
the prosecution, defense or settlement of the claim or action of the plaintiff,
or any of the parties to such claim or action, or which by its policy agrees
to prosecute or defend the action brought by the plaintiff or any of the parties to such action, or agrees to engage counsel to prosecute or defend said
action, or agrees to pay the costs of such litigation, is by this section made a
proper party defendant in any action brought by plaintiff on account of any
claim against the insured.
"(2) When any insurer shall be made a party defendant pursuant to this
section and it shall appear at any time before or during the trial that there
is or may be a cross-issue between the insurer and the insured or any issue
between any other party and the insurer involving the question whether the
insurer would be liable if judgment should be rendered against the insured,
the court may, upon motion of any defendant in any such action, cause the
person, who may be liable upon such cross-issue, to be made a party defendant to said action and all the issues involved in said controversy determined
in the trial of said action. Nothing herein contained shall be construed as
prohibiting the trial court from directing and conducting first a trial as to
whether or not the insured is liable to the plaintiff or other party and directing a separate trial on the issues involving the question whether under its
policy the insurer is liable for the payment in whole or in part of any judgment against the insured or the amount of such liability."
The history of the struggle previous to 1931 to make insurers parties defendant may be briefly traced as follows:
The first statute to permit joinder of insurance companies was passed in
1925, Wis. Stats. (1925) § 85.25. This act was held to apply to the form of
the policy, the provisions of the statute becoming a part of the policy and
making the insurer directly liable to third persons. The insurer could thus
be properly joined as a defendant. Ducolmun v. Inter-State Exchange, 193
Wis. 179, 212 N.W. 289, 214 N.W. 616 (1927). However, under this statute
the insurer could not be joined if it were not liable by the terms of its policy
to the assured for the damages he caused. Fanslau v. Federal Mutual Auto
Ins. Co., 194 Wis. 8, 215 N.W. 589 (1927); nor could the insurer be joined if
its policy contained a "no action" clause, postponing action against it until
final judgment against the assured. Morgan v. Hunt, 196 Wis. 298, 220 N.W.
224 (1928). But see, Heinzen v. Undee'writers Cas. Co., 208 Wis. 512, 243 N.W.
448 (1932) where the particular "no action" clause in question was held only
to bar the assured and not third parties from suing before final judgment
against the assured. In 1929 § 85.25 was renumbered 85.93 and amended
to make the insurer liable to third persons "irrespective of whether such liability be in praesenti or contingent and to become fixed or certain by final
judgment against the insured." But this amendment was held not to destroy
the efficacy of the "no action" clause, which had by then become a standard
provision of all automobile policies. Bergstein v. Popkin, 202 Wis. 625, 233
N.W. 572 (1930). However, it was held that the insurer, under a policy which
did not have a "no action" clause, could be sued directly by the injured third
party without joining the representative of the estate of the deceased insured.
Elliott v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 201 Wis. 445, 230 N.W. 87 (1930).
8
Pawlowski v. Eskofski, 209 Wis. 189, 244 N.W. 611 (1932). The only question
raised in this case was whether the amendment to § 260.11, permitting
joinder of the insurer, was constitutional when applied to policies, which contained "no action" clauses and were issued before the passage of the amendment. The court held the "no action" clause had value and that the amendment
impaired the obligation of policies issued prior to its enactment and was therefore unconstitutional and of no effect as to them. At page 195 of the official
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however, the Wisconsin Court held that the amendment rendered ineffective provisions of a policy, issued since June 30, 1931, postponing
the time for commencement of an action against the insurer until final
judgment has been entered against the insured ;9 so that today the insurer is a proper party defendant even in cases where jurisdiction can
not be obtained over the assured, whose negligence allegedly caused the
accidentY'
Since the amendment and the decisions which sanction joinder of
the insurer, the trial court in many cases has permitted the plaintiff to
point out to the jury the defendant insurance company's interest in the
reports, there is found this significant statement: "The many criticisms of
counsel for injecting the fact of insurance on the trial contained in the opinions of this court have been based upon the idea that the court considered it
prejudicial to have the fact called to the jury's attention. Our reversals for
not dismissing and our criticisms were all pointless if the basis of them did
not prejudicially affect the rights of the parties. And if it did prejudicially
affect the rights of the parties, a provision of the contract securing that right
is of value and must be upheld against a statute enacted subsequent to the
execution of the contract."
9
Lang v. Baumann, et al.,
213 Wis. 258, 251 N.W. 461 (1934). In this case,
action was brought to recover damages for the death of an automobile guest
caused by the alleged negligent driving of the defendant host. The Employers'
Mutual Indemnity Co., the insurance carrier on the host's car, was joined as
defendant. The case was tried and juidgment entered for the plaintiff after the
insurance company's plea in abatement had been overruled. In affirming this
judgment, the court referred to Bergstein v. Popkin, note 7, supra, pointing out
that the court had said in that case with reference to § 85.93 (page 266) :
"The act which was passed * * * related wholly and solely to 'liability,'
while the bill which was refused passage related distinctly to who might be
made parties defendant. The Legislature quite evidently was willing to make
the liability of the insurer to the injured person as absolute as possible, but
was not willing to deprive the insurer of the right to postpone suit against it
until the amount of the damage had been ascertained as provided;" and then
continued (page 267): "The court plainly indicated the sort of amendment
that it considered necessary to render ineffective clauses postponing actions
against the insured. The Legislature has followed the precise, method suggested by the court, and the amendment immediately followed the decision
in this case. We entertain no doubt that the Legislative intent was to change
the doctrine of the Morgan and Bergstein cases. If there is any basis for
doubt, it is dissipated by the provisions of subdivision (2) of § 260.11,
which provides in detail for the situation created where the insurer who has
been joined has a cross-issue with the insured."
10 Oertel v. Williams, et al., (Wis. 1934) 251 N.W. 465. In this case the action
was brought as the result of an accident which happened in Indiana. The
plaintiff was a resident of New York, and the defendant Williams, was a resident of Pennsylvania. The insurance carrier on William's car was joined as
defendant under a policy issued by the company on February 12, 1932, in Wisconsin, which was then Williams' residence. The policy contained a "no action" clause, and there was no service on Williams nor any appearance by
him. The Supreme Court, in sustaining plaintiff's demurrer to the company's
plea in abatement, held that the insurer was a proper party defendant and
could be sued directly without bringing in the assured. Chief Justice Rosenberry dissented: (page 466) : "Under the law as declared in the opinion of
the court, the insurer now becomes a principal and is now compelled at his
risk to defend the insured without the aid, co-operation, or even the presence
of the insured. If recovery is had against the insurer, the insured is not bound
thereby. Further, the insurer is not permitted to litigate the question of its
liability under the policy, as that could only be done in the presence of the
insured; he being a necessary party thereto."
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case. During the trial, evidence sometimes is permitted to be offered as
to the defendant's being insured, and upon argument the plaintiff has
been allowed to advise the jury that the insurance company was made
a party because it had insured the automobile which caused the injury
to the plaintiff. It is but a step further to intimate to the jury that an
insurance company is the real party in interest who will be called upon
to pay any damages that may be awarded to the plaintiff. All this in
spite of the fact that the Wisconsin Court has held that any reference
to an insurance company, beyond the exceptions previously noted, 1 is
improper, as tending to cause the jury to ignore the testimony on the
real issues between the parties to the accident. Prior to the passage of
Section 260.11, such practice had been disapproved and held to be
highly prejudicial and improper even where the insurance company was
12
a party defendant to the action.

Although the act amending Section 260.11 may appear to be a simple change in procedure and harmless in actual practice, nevertheless it
has created a situation where trial courts are now ruling that evidence
and statements as to insurance coverage are admissable. Recently a trial
court, when asked to withhold the fact of insurance from the jury,
stated that the name of the insurance company would appear in the
caption to the paper containing the questions of the special verdict, and
that the court had no authority to withhold the names of defendants
from the jury. No individual defendant, who is insured, would object
if it were not for the fact that this prejudice of the jury might cause
it to find him guilty of negligence when in fact he was not negligent.
No honest insurance company would have any objection to being made
a defendant, if it were not for the fact, as recognized by the courts,
that prejudice is aroused which causes the jury to disregard the evidence as to negligence and find all issues in favor of the plaintiff as
well as to increase the amount awarded as damages.
Many attorneys profess a firm conviction that in cases in which the
insurance company is named as a party, the attorney for the defense
enters the trial with an unfair handicap, sometimes too great for him to
overcome. Neither the insured, his insurance company, nor the attorney
who is retained as defense counsel should, in fairness, be subjected to
that handicap.
III.
The power of the court to make rules of evidence and to prescribe
the proper conduct of a trial is impaired by the amendment to Section
260.11.
If the right to have a fair and impartial trial in the administration
21

See footnotes 3 and 4, supra.

12Sweet v. Underwriters Casualty Co., 206 Wis. 447, 453, 240 N.W. 199 (1932).
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of justice impelled the court to establish the rule that evidence, statements or insinuations that the defendant is insured are prejudicial, improper, and not to be countenanced,'13 then an act of the Legislature,
which vitiates this rule and in effect denies a litigant's right to a fair
and impartial trial, is unconstitutional as an invasion of the judicial
14
power vested in the courts.
The Wisconsin court in the past has guarded against any usurpation of its power by the Legislature. Chapter 31, Laws of 1923 (Section 2857a, as amended, Wis. Stats., 1923), which provided that in no
case, where a jury has been selected and testimony taken or evidence
introduced, shall a verdict be directed by the trial judge, was held void
as a violation of Section 2, Article VII of the Wisconsin Constitution. 15 It was stated in the Thoe case' 6 that it has been of the very
essence of judicial power from time immemorial in the common law
courts of this country and in England, to determine the legal sufficiency
of the evidence and the rights of parties properly before the court. It
would seem that this power would be abrogated no less by a rule of
practice which in effect permits and encourages prejudice to become
a determining factor in a trial, than by a rule which takes from the
court the right to direct a verdict in proper cases. In both cases, the
hands of the court are tied and the court's effort to insure justice to
the litigants is frustrated.
The reverse of the situation which presently confronts the courts in
Wisconsin arose in an adjoining state recently. In Michigan it is the
See, Walker v. Ponmush, 206 Wis. 45, 50, 51, 238 N.W. 859 (1931).
§ 2 provides: "The judicial power of this state, both as
to matters of law and equity, shall be vested in a supreme court, circuit courts,
courts of probate, and in justices of the peace."
'5 Thoe v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 181 Wis. 456, 195 N.W. 407 (1923). The
Constitution vested in the courts all the powers exercised by a court under
the common law. Kiley v. C. M. & St. P. R. Co., 138 Wis. 215, 225, 119 N.W.
309, 120 N.W. 756 (1909). An act of the legislature purporting to restore to a
named person the license to practice law (Chapter 480, Laws of 1931), which
had been previously revoked by a judgment of the Supreme Court, was held
to be in violation of the clause of the Constitution conferring judicial power
upon the court. In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240 N.W. 441 (1932). The court
stated (pages 382, 383) :
"Under our constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent and co-ordinate branches of the government. Neither branch
enjoys all the powers of sovereignity, but each is supreme in that branch of
sovereignity which properly belongs to its department. Neither department
should so act as to embarrass the other in the discharge of its respective
functions. This was the scheme and thought of the people in setting up the
form of government under which we exist. * * *
"The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon
which the administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this
respect is exclusive. By committing a portion of the powers of sovereignity to
the judicial department of our state government, under a scheme which it was
supposed rendered it immune from embarrassment or interference by any
other department of government, the courts cannot escape responsibility for
the manner in which the powers of sovereignity thus committed to the judicial
department are exercised."
3. Thoe v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 181 Wis. 456, 459, 195 N.W. 407 (1923).
'"

14 Wis. Const. Art. II,
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rule, as in Wisconsin, that on voir dire the jury may be examined as to
interest in any insurance company, if such questioning is done in good
faith.1 7 In 1929, the Michigan Legislature passed an act prohibiting
joinder of the insurer as a party defendant as well as any reference
during the course of the trial to an insurance company or to the question of carrying insurance.18 The Supreme Court regarded this act as
abrogating the rule permitting on the voir dire the naming of an insurance company when such is done in good faith, and as a consequence
held it void as an intereference with the judicial power vested in the
courts by the State Constitution.19 The same reasoning should impel
the Wisconsin Court to hold unconstitutional a statute, the practical
effect of which is to nullify well established rules pertaining to the
proper conduct of a trial.
IV.
Section 260.11, wtihout change, can be construed so as to afford a
proper remedy without doing injustice to either party.
Courts have always been hesitant, and rightfully so, to declare an
act of the legislature unconstitutional.2 0 As a consequence, although
this statute as it works out today is clearly unconstitutional, it can easily
be administered so as to carry out its avowed and only legitimate purpose, that is, to avoid multiplicity of suits. 21 The Wisconsin Court can
and should adopt a rule making the insurance company a party only
for the limited purpose of making it a party to the judgment, and set
up a system of pleading whereby the purpose of the statute will be
carried out by an ancillary proceeding somewhat in the nature of garnishment. 22 In this proceeding, the insurer could litigate whether or not
it is liable to the insured under the terms of its policy for the damages
17 Church v. Stoldt, 215 Mich. 469, 184 N.W. 469 (1921) ; Hohnan v. Cole, 242

Mich. 402, 218 N.W. 795 (1928).
18 Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), Sec. 12460.
19 Harker v. Bushhouse, et al., 254 Mich. 187, 236 N.W. 222 (1931).
20 See, Doar, The Power of the Courts to Declare Laws Unconstitutional (1933)
21 23 Reports of the State Bar Association 29.

The plaintiff after recovering a judgment against the insured should not be
compelled to start a separate action against the insurer with the attendant
delay and inconvenience. See, Glatz v. General Acc., F. & L. Assur. Co., 175

Wis. 42, 183 N.W. 683 (1921). It is submitted that if an examination of the
court records was made it would be found that in not more than one per
cent of the cases was the plaintiff compelled to start a second action against
the insurance company after having obtained final judgment against the assured. A final judgment is always paid immediately by an honest insurance
2 2 company unless there has been a substantial breach of policy coverage.
It is to be noted that the very words of the amendment to § 260.11
contemplate that such action might well be taken by the court. Subsection (2)
provides in part: "Nothing herein contained shall be construed as prohibiting
the trial court from directing and conducting first a trial as to whether or
not the insured is liable to the plaintiff or other party and directing a separate
trial on the issues involving the question whether under its policy the insurer
is liable for the payment in whole or in part of any judgment against the insured or the amount of such liability."
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caused by his negligence. The name of the insurance company could be
kept out of the case until the trial on the issues of liability and damages
had been completed. 23 The court would then be in a position to reaffirm, without mockery, the established rule that evidence and statements as to insurance are inadmissible because of their patent irrelevancy and prejudicial effect.
V.
May it be stated in conclusion that the effect of the amendment to
Section 260.11 is to penalize the automobile owner who insures his car,
by denying to him a fair and impartial trial. This can not continue
without great detriment to the processes of justice and to the welfare
of the public as a whole. Unfair discrimination between the owner who
is insured and the one who is not will cause the one insured to lose
confidence in the administration of justice. Higher premiums, necessitated by the increased losses, will cause many drivers to drop their insurance.
One must recognize, of course, that a certain amount of prejudicial
matter is bound to creep in, but the opening of the doors to a wholesale influx of elements causing prejudice and passion leads inevitably to
a lessening of respect for and a consequent decrease in the efficiency of
the machinery set up for administering justice. No act of the Legislature should be permitted to produce results which stand in the way
24
of exact justice for all who come under the jurisdiction of the court.

23 To

make this procedure as completely successful as possible the rule should
provide that the name of the insurance company as defendant shall not be
printed on the calendar of the court nor in the title of case on any of the
pleadings or papers which might come to the jury's attention. This would go
far to keep the fact that an insurance company is interested in the case from
being constantly impressed on the jury.
24 The writer wishes to make clear that this article is not intended in any way
to decry trial by jury. It is his opinion that in the ordinary automobile case
a jury is a most satisfactory judge of all isues of fact. However, it is up to
the courts and the attorneys to see that only relevant, competent, and material
facts are admitted for consideration by the jury; and that the issues of the
particular case are correctly and clearly defined.

